could escape liability. To resolve that issue, the courts had to examine whether the existing defamation laws established an appropriate balance between two sets of conflicting values: those of reputation and those of freedom of expression.
The defamation laws which the courts had before them essentially established that, in order to recover damages, a plaintiff had to prove that the material complained of was defamatory and that it referred to the plaintiff. Inferences of falsity and malice favored the plaintiff.' Defendants, in turn, could defend themselves by pleadingjustification, fair comment, or privilege. 9 Thus, a person who published an assertion of fact or a comment was guilty of a tort and liable for damages unless he or she could positively justify or excuse the publication in the particular circumstances of the case. Proof of the publication of the defamatory statement discharged the plaintiffs onus and cast upon the defendant the burden of establishing some defense.
If. THE SOURCE: NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN'°T
he action in Sullivan arose because of an editorial advertisement placed in the New York Times. The advertisement, which supported the civil rights movement, specifically referred to and described an incident of police abuse in Montgomery, Alabama. Despite not being mentioned by name, Sullivan, who was an elected commissioner from Montgomery, sued the New York Times for libel." A jury awarded him $500,000 in damages.' 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision.'" Referring to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression, the Court placed restrictions on the operation of the law of defamation. The Court affirmed that, when allegations which would ordinarily be defamatory were made of a public official in relation to his official conduct, an action by him would not succeed unless he proved with convincing clarity that, at the time the defamatory statements were made, the defendant either knew them to be false 8. In defamation proceedings a plaintiffbears no onus of establishing either the falsity of the defamatory statement or the existence of malice. I1. Sullivan, whose particular duty was to supervise the police department, argued that the advertisement would be read as referring to him. Id. at 258.
12. This amount was awarded despite the fact that only 35 copies of the edition of the New York Times which carried the advertisement were circulated in Montgomery, and only 394 copies were circulated in the state of Alabama. Id. at 260 n.3. [Vol. 10: 1 SULLI VAN VISITS THE COMMONWEALTH or was reckless as to whether they were or not.' 4 In the Court's view, only this standard would provide sufficient "breathing space" for criticism of public officials, and for the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 5 Two principles were established in Sullivan. The first being that the Bill of Rights reaches judicial orders enforcing the libel laws of a state in private litigation. The common law of defamation constitutes government action because the application of the Constitution depends on the fact of state power.' 6 The second principle is that the common law presumptions of falsity and malice impose an unconstitutional fetter upon freedom of speech, for they have a tendency to "chill expression." Since critics of official conduct must guarantee the truth of all factual assertions or else suffer libel judgements, they are bound to engage in self-censorship.' 7 The crux of the Court's argument is that allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not guarantee that only false speech is deterred. It is often too difficult to prove the truth of the alleged libel in all its factual particulars. Under the existing rule, "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so."" The traditional common law rule not only assures that critics shy away from making controversial statements but it also has the effect of limiting the diversity of public debate. 9 The Sullivan test is thus premised on the notion that a rule which has a "chilling effect" on speech constitutes a greater evil than a rule which permits false information to enter the public arena.
I1. THE SEARCHERS: THE COMMONWEALTH COMES A'LOOKING
In Theophanous, in Derbyshire and in Hill, national courts examined whether the modifications engrafted upon the common law of libel by the United States Supreme Court were appropriate for them. 0 They had to decide 14. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. The standard of "convincing clarity" is more rigorous than the preponderance of the evidence standard which normally applies in civil actions.
15. Id. at 270.
16. The Court affirmed that "[it matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute." Id. at 265. In its view, "[t]he test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." Id.
fell within the range of "political discussion."26 In examining the relationship and links that exist between the implied freedom and the common law, the court maintained that whenever the Constitution, expressly or by implication, is at variance with a doctrine of the common law, it is the latter which must yield to the former." According to the court, "when the purpose of the implication is to protect the efficacious working of the system of representative government mandated by the Constitution, the freedom which is implied should be understood as being capable of extending to freedom from restraints imposed by law, whether statute law or common law." 28 The court then turned its attention to the question of whether the existing laws of defamation inhibited freedom of communication. Relying on American jurisprudence, the court affirmed that "an implication of freedom of communication, the purpose of which is to ensure the efficacy of representative democracy, must extend to protect political discussion from exposure to onerous criminal and civil liability if the implication is to be effective in achieving its purpose." 9 The court's position was that the balance of the law of defamation was tilted too far in favor of the protection of the reputation of individual politicians, at the expense of freedom of communication and the efficient functioning of the democratic society. 30 The problem with the existing law was that it "seriously inhibit[ed] freedom of communication on political matters, especially in relation to the views, conduct and suitability for office of an elected representative of the people in the Australian Parliament." 3 '
Having determined that the existing law of defamation was unconstitutional, the court then went on to articulate which principles would be consistent with the implied constitutional guarantee. In its view, Australian constitutional law required that a disseminator of false information about politicians' behavior in, and suitability for, public office have a complete defense to a defamation claim brought by politicians if they could demonstrate (a) that they "[were] unaware of the falsity of the material published"; (b) that they "did not publish the material recklessly, that is, not caring whether the material was true or false"; and (c) that "publication was reasonable in the 
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circumstances." 32 To establish reasonableness defendants must either show that they took some steps to check the accuracy of the impugned material or show that it was otherwisejustified in publishing without taking such steps or steps which were adequate." The plurality's decision in Theophanous was clearly influenced by the Sullivan decision, 34 despite the warnings of Chief Justice Mason that American jurisprudence should be "treat[ed] with some caution"" in light of the fact that American constitutional provisions relating to speech are different from those found in Australia. While the First Amendment protects in an explicit way freedom of expression generally, the Australian Constitution protects, in an implicit fashion only, freedom of communication in matters of political discussion, and only because such speech constitutes an indispensable element in ensuring the efficacious working of democracy and government. 3 6 The Australian court utilized the Sullivan judgment to bolster its decision that "freedom of communication" could not be construed simply as a negative constraint on legislative power and that the freedom had to be respected by all governmental agencies, including the courts, when interpreting statutes and applying the common law." It further referred to 32. Id. at 26. Justice Deane, the fourth member of the majority, would have gone further in the application of the implied constitutional guarantee. His position was that the constitutional guarantee operated so as "to preclude completely the application of... defamation laws to impose liability in damages upon the citizen for the publication ofstatements about the official conduct or suitability of a member of the Parliament or other holder of [a] 
36.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the plurality should not have invoked the Sullivan decision to the extent it did. His position was that "the assistance which cases decided under other Constitutions or Conventions can give in determining the scope of the freedom is extremely limited." Id. at 39. American jurisprudence, in Justice Brennan's opinion, should be referred to with caution because the United States Constitution is different from the Australian Constitution and because the history which has affected the interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments is different from Australia's history. Id. at 41. He rejected Sullivan as a model for the Australian court because "[i]n this country, following the long tradition of the common law, we have accepted that personal reputation is a proper subject of protection, no less for those in public office as for private citizens." Id.
37. Id. at 16-17. Despite Justice Brennan's argument that comparisons with other jurisdictions were pointless, he nonetheless referred to the Canadian Charter ofRights and the Canadian decisions establishing that judicial decisions do not constitute "governmental action."
Id. at 42-43.
[Vol. 10:1 Sullivan to support its conclusion that defamation laws constitute effective tools for politicians to "chill" free speech. 38 Having determined that existing defamation laws were unconstitutional, the plurality also invoked Sullivan to support its belief that the efficacious workings of representative democracy and government did not demand that all actors involved in political discussions be granted an absolute immunity. If the Sullivan Court had rejected an absolutist approach, then surely the Australian court, with only its implicit guarantee, need not fashion an absolute exemption. 39 It is when formulating a test or a list of criteria to be used to determine liability or non-liability in defamation actions that differences between the positions of the American and Australian courts arise. While continuing to refer to the Sullivan decision, the Australian court does so in a different manner. At this point, the court begins by pointing out the problems associated with the American decision. This technique allows the court to distance itself from the Sullivan solution and to justify its own position. Having hailed the Sullivan judgment in the first part of its decision, the Australian court must explain why it decided not to incorporate into Australian law the "actual malice" test developed in the United States. Thus the Australian court, within the same judgment, both hails the beneficial effects of the Sullivan decision and emphasizes criticism associated with it.
Although the test developed by the Australian court is clearly influenced by the decision in Sullivan, it departs from American law in significant ways. Most notably, the Australian defense articulated in Theophanous operates only in respect of "political discussion." After criticizing the United States Supreme Court's extension of the Sullivan rationale to candidates for political office, public administrators, and public figures, the Australian court observed "that these extensions, other than the extension to cover candidates for public office, should not form part.of our law."
The court in Theophanous further distanced itself from American law by stipulating that the burden of proving the three parts of the Australian 38. Id. at 18-20. As Loveland posits, the court accepted that the common law chilled freedom of speech in Australia without any empirical evidence. His position is that "the absence of any reference at all to the political difficulties that libel law has caused in modem Australia ... opens the court to the accusation that it has simply been seduced by grand theory and compelling rhetoric." See Loveland, supra note 34, at 130. 40. Id. at 21. Earlier in its judgment, the court affirmed "that political discussion includ[ed] discussion of the conduct, policies or fitness for office of government, political parties, public officers and those seeking public office." Id. at 13. "The concept also includ [ed] discussion of the political views and public conduct of persons who are engaged in activities that have become the subject of political debate,..." Id. The court acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a distinction between political discussion and other forms of expression but argued that "it should be possible to develop, by means of decisions in particular cases, an acceptable limit to the type of discussion which falls within the constitutional protection." Id.
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defense (that is, no knowledge of falsehood, absence of recklessness, and reasonableness) rested on the defendant. It justified this departure on the grounds that the laws of the United States give insufficient weight to individual reputation. 4 Its solution was to adopt a variant of the Sullivan test, a variant that would recognize more clearly the values of Australian culture. The court thus went to great lengths to make clear that it was not adopting or introducing into Australian jurisprudence the actual malice test created in
Sullivan.
The Australian judgment demonstrates how the comparative technique can be utilized by courts. When faced with difficult questions, especially constitutional questions, national courts can learn from the experience of other countries. Foreign jurisprudence can be used to demonstrate the desirability of reforming domestic laws as well as the impact that such reforms may have. " ' Furthermore, the decision illustrates that domestic courts need not, and must not, uncritically import foreign rules into their national systems. Foreign legal rules that work in another system, may need to be adapted to reflect the realities and differences, be they cultural, constitutional, or economic, of the importing country. 4 3
V. THE UNITED KINGDOM QUANDARY
In Derbyshire, a municipal council brought a defamation action against the publisher of a newspaper. The claim for damages arose from articles concerning the authority's management of certain funds. The issue before the courts was whether a local authority could sue for libel in respect of "words which reflect on it in its governmental and administrative functions." Although at first instance the court rejected the newspaper's contention that councils lacked the legal capacity to bring a libel action over criticism of their 41. The court affirmed that "[e]ven assuming that, in conformity with Sullivan, the test is confined to plaintiffs who are public officials, in our view it gives inadequate protection to reputation." Id. 
47
While the Court of Appeal had resorted to the European Convention on Human Rights to decide that a local authority could not sue in defamation to protect its governmental reputation, the House of Lords found no reason to rely on the Convention." Lord Keith, writing for the majority, argued that considerations of policy were determinative of the issue. Because governmental bodies are different from other corporations, they must be "open to uninhibited public criticism." 4 9 Anyone who attempts to stifle or fetter such criticism commits "political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable kind." 5 In the Court's view, the problem with allowing governmental entities to have recourse to civil actions for defamation, is that it would "inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech." 5 Lord Keith relied on United States, Commonwealth, and South African authorities to support his policy arguments to the effect that the threat of civil actions for libel have a tendency to chill speech. He had no misgivings in referring to, and utilizing, the arguments expounded in Sullivan to support his conclusions. 2 His position was to the effect that the public interest considerations which underlay the Sullivan decision were equally valid in English law. 3 This, despite the fact that Britain does not possess an express constitutional guarantee of the right of free speech that is equivalent to the American society, adheres to a system of parliamentary sovereignty."
The decision of the Lords was therefore that, under the common law of England, a local authority does not have the right to maintain an action of damages for defamatory matter reflecting on its governmental and administrative functions. 56 Their position was to the effect that not only is there no public interest favoring the right of governmental bodies "to sue for libel, but that it is contrary to the public interest that they should have it. It is contrary to the public interest because to admit such actions would place an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech."" 7 The Lords also maintained that although local authorities could not initiate defamation actions, individual councillors could do so."' Despite engaging in comparative analysis and referring to the decision in Sullivan, 59 the House of Lords did not adopt or incorporate the actual malice test into English law.' The reality is that they did not fashion any test 54 56. Local authorities can protect their reputation by using alternate remedies. For example, they could start actions for malicious falsehoods or they could simply defend themselves through more speech of their own. 57. Derbyshire, All E.R. at 1019. 58. Id. at 1020. According to Lord Keith, a publication that attacks the activities of the authority "will necessarily be an attack on the body of councillors which represents the controlling party, or on the executives who carry on the day-to-day management of its affairs. If the individual reputation of any of these is wrongly impaired by the publication any of these can himself bring proceedings for defamation." Id.
59. References to American cases stopped with the 1964 Sullivan decision. Lord Keith did not find it necessary to discuss the impact the decision has had on the actual development of libel law in the United States. As Loveland explains, "[i]n conducting only so cursory a survey of the United States' constitutional landscape, Lord Keith decline[s] to mine a seam of case law which, while undoubtedly unstable, nevertheless offers an extraordinary rich array of raw materials from which to sculpt several considered arguments as to how extensive a scope should be afforded to any reform of libel law." See Loveland, supra note 55, at 212-13. 60. As Loveland and Sharland point out, "[t]here seems to be little sympathy among English judges for the direct importation of Sullivan into domestic common law." Andrew Sharland & ]an Loveland, The Defamation Act 1996 and Political Libels, 1997 PUB. L. 113, 123. An attempt to introduce an amendment to have the public figure concept recognized in the Defamation Bill in 1996 was unsuccessful. According to Loveland and Sharland, "given that such reforms were omitted from the 1996 Act, it would seem inappropriate for the courts to take such an initiative." Id. Under English law, therefore, there is no recognition of a general privilege to defame a prominent individual who holds a public position on the grounds that what is said expresses the writer's honest and reasonable belief on a matter which is one of public [Vol. I0:I that resembles the one expounded in that decision. In fact, by ruling that public authorities are completely precluded from starting libel actions, the Lords set aside the Sullivan rationale to the effect that the First Amendment does not afford complete immunity to public officials from libel suits. 6 What the Derbyshire court does, is invoke Sullivan and American jurisprudence to extrapolate general principles. Thus, Sullivan is relied on to establish the importance of free speech in the context of criticism of government and to explain that libel laws are worrisome since they have a tendency to "chill" freedom of speech. Having set out these principles, the Lords then rely on them as justification to revise the political libel laws of England. If free speech in the context of political discussion merits protection and if libel laws have a chilling effect, then surely courts are warranted in giving priority to speech claims over those of other competing interests.
VI. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
The proceedings in Hill arose after representatives of the Church of Scientology and their counsel Manning held a press conference outside a courthouse. 62 At this conference, Manning commented upon allegations contained in a notice of motion by which Scientology intended to start criminal proceedings against Crown attorney Casey Hill. The notice of motion alleged that Hill had misled a judge and had breached orders sealing certain documents belonging to the Church of Scientology. 63 After contempt proceedings, which determined that the allegations against the Crown attorney were untrue and without foundation, Hill commenced an action for damages in libel." Both the Church of Scientology and its counsel were found to have defamed Hill. 6 67. The appellant attorney also raised the defense of qualified privilege which attaches to reports relating to judicial proceedings.
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establish a proper balance between the values of reputation and expression, the actual malice standard of liability articulated in Sullivan had to be adopted." 8 In its judgment, the court reaffirmed" 9 that although the Charter could not be applied directly to scrutinize the common law of defamation in private litigation, 70 it had to be developed in accordance with Charter values. 7 To determine whether the common law of defamation complied with the underlying values of the Charter, the court examined whether the common law struck an appropriate balance between the competing values of reputation and freedom of expression." Despite recognizing that freedom of expression is crucial to democratic society, the court argued that defamatory speech is only tenuously related to the core values which underlie section 2(b) of the Charter. ' The court also affirmed that the protection of a person's reputation from defamatory speech constitutes a worthy interest in a democratic society.7
Having established the importance of reputation within Canadian society, the court then turned its attention to Sullivan. Since it did not wish to incorporate the actual malice test into Canadian law, the court sought to distance itself from that decision. To this end, the court affirmed that the social and political context within which Sullivan arose was completely different from the one that existed in Hill. 5 In Sullivan, the speech involved was political; the media was entangled in the conflict, and there existed fears that the existing defamation laws would have a chilling effect on the media. 76 On the other hand, the appeal in Hill did not involve political commentary about government policies and the media was not directly implicated in the conflict.
7
" The Court also noted that government officials in Canada, contrarily to the situation in the United States, did not enjoy the benefit of a qualified privilege as regards to their public statements. 8 Its position was that "in Canada [,] there is no broad privilege accorded to the public statements of government officials which needs to be counterbalanced by a similar right for private individuals."
79
To demonstrate the dangers associated with the American solution, the court focused on American academic and judicial 80 criticism of the actual malice rule. Dissatisfaction with the achievements of the decision rests on the fact that, since Sullivan, "libel actions have increased ... in both number and size of awards."" 2 The increase in litigation and the requirements of actual malice have also put "pressure on the fact-finding process since courts are now required to make determinations as to who is a public figure and what is a matter of... public concern."" 2 Furthermore, the decision, according to the court, has shifted the focus of defamation actions from truth to fault. The 74. The Court linked protection of individual reputation with rights of privacy and personal dignity. Its position was that "although it is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, the good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a concept which underlies all the Charter rights." Hill, 2 S.C.R. at 1179.
75. According to the court, "[nione of the factors which prompted the United States Supreme Court to rewrite the law of defamation in America are present in the case at bar." Id. at 1188.
76. Id. at l180-8 1. 77. Id. at 1188. After reviewingjury verdicts in Canada, the court was of the opinion that "there is no danger of numerous large awards threatening the viability of media organizations." Id.
78. In the United States, government officials enjoy a qualified privilege with respect to materials published in the course of conducting the affairs of government. 
Id.
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detrimental results associated with this change include: denial of opportunity for the plaintiff to "establish the falsity of the defamatory statements and to determine the consequent reputational harm"; necessity of "detailed inquiry into matters of media procedure"; "increase[s in] the cost of litigation; and a depreca[tion of] truth in public discourse." 83 In order to emphasize that rejecting the American solution would not mean that Canada stood alone in protecting individual reputation above freedom of expression, the court referred to the English and Australian decisions in Derbyshire and in Theophanous. It pointed out that both the House of Lords and the High Court of Australia recently declined to adopt the Sullivan actual malice requirement." For added measure, the court mentioned that numerous international law reform organizations have also criticized the Sullivan rule. 5 The court's conclusion was to the effect that, since the Sullivan standard of liability was the subject of much criticism in the United States and elsewhere and since the actual malice standard rule had "not been followed in the United Kingdom or Australia, [there was] no reason for adopting it in Canada in an action between private litigants."" Not only was the existing law of defamation not "unduly restrictive or inhibiting", but it "surely [was] not requiring too much of individuals that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they publish." 8 " The court's position was that, because "the common law of defamation complie [d] with the underlying values of the Charter" in its application to the parties in that action, there was "no need to amend or alter it." ' Despite using the comparative method to fashion itsjudgment, the court did not engage in an extensive comparative analysis. 9 Although it had before it foreign jurisprudence which specifically examined how free speech and reputational interests could best be reconciled in the context of defamation laws, the court, in assessing the approaches and solutions adopted by foreign countries, focused mainly on criticism surrounding the American solution." Although the court referred to the decisions in Theophanous and in Derbyshire, it did so only to point out that both cases specifically rejected the "malice" standard of liability. Thus, it barely addressed the Australian and English courts' conclusions that libel laws "chill" speech 9 ' and it ignored the Australian High Court's affirmation that despite some degree of balancing in the common law, the judges who developed it were not concerned with freedom of expression in a constitutional sense and so did not give it adequate weight in their balancing process. 92 Furthermore, the Canadian court did not address in what ways the Australian court chose to modify the common law. Such a stratagem is not surprising, considering that the Supreme Court's invocation of foreign jurisprudence was mainly to buttress its initial conclusion that the malice standard should not be adopted in Canadian law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, one area of law where courts are prone to engage in comparative analysis is that of constitutional law. When dealing with fundamental rights issues such as free expression, national courts often turn to foreign jurisprudence to examine how other countries have sought to reconcile free expression rights with other competing values and what solutions they have found to particular problems. 93 Foreign jurisprudence is useful since it provides a yardstick by which to measure the desirability and the impact that particular reforms may have.
One factor which plays a crucial role in determining whether a foreign solution should be transplanted elsewhere is the international standing of the donor country." It is always easier and more feasible for a national court to refer to, and to adopt, a foreign solution when it emanates from a country that commands both economic and legal respect within the world community." 
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Another factor is that of sheer quantity. As more countries lean towards a particular position, it becomes more difficult for a national court to go against the tide. While the argument can be made that one country has made a mistake in adopting a particular solution, it becomes much more difficult to advance that numerous countries which have examined a somewhat identical issue have taken the wrong path. 96 While national courts may rely on comparative materials in order to find a solution to the problem they are faced with, they need not blindly adopt the foreign approach."' As the decisions in Theaphonous, Derbyshire, and Hill demonstrate, foreign solutions are not necessarily appropriate for a particular country. This is particularly true whenever the answer to a problem requires that courts involve themselves in a balancing of values. 8 Values, after all, have a direct link to cultural identity."
The existence of such links, however, does not mean that courts should shy away from comparative analogies. By pointing out that different solutions to a problem are possible, such analogies often force courts to re-evaluate their own position as regards the weight to be accorded to certain values. In the area of libel law, for example, an examination of the Sullivan decision forced Canadian, Australian, and English courts to ask themselves why, if, and to what extent, they should protect reputational rights above free speech rights. 96 . Herein lies one ofthe dangers associated with comparative analogies. National courts may find it easier to simply incorporate into their own systems ready-made rules that are widely accepted rather than seek innovative solutions that require time to formulate and that are subject to criticism both at the national and the international level. This problem, however, is somewhat offset by the fact that legal rules are rarely transplanted wholly from one system to another. The process of modification which usually accompanies the act of transplanting ensures that legal rules are constantly being reformulated.
97. The issue of whether courts should engage in comparative analogies is somewhat different from that of whether foreign solutions should be incorporated without modifications into different settings. While numerous authors agree that comparative analogies are useful (see, for example, Koopmans, supra note 5), few go so far as to advance that the process of transplanting should proceed without any modifications (see, for example, ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 6, at 16). One must also remember that, although a national court may seem to be adopting the language of a particular foreign rule or decision, once transplanted, the rule may operate in a totally different way within the receiving society than it does within the donor country. For further discussion of this issue, see WATSON, supra note 6, ch. 3.
98. While one could advance that in many areas of law legal rules are "not peculiarly devised for the particular society in which theynow operate" (see WATSON, supra note 6, at 96), such argument has less force within the constitutional sphere. When national courts develop constitutional rules, more often than not, these rules are formulated to operate within a particular context since they reflect and incorporate a set of national values.
99. 
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At the very least, the comparative analogy in Theaphonous, Derbyshire, and Hill provided national courts with assistance in framing the legal and cultural questions that they had to address.
